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reconciles the conﬂicting results in previous studies that ﬁnd advertising to be
geneous product markets, but oversupplied in differentiated product markets when
ation is “small”. In equilibrium, purely informative advertising is undersupplied when
close substitutes and oversupplied when brands are more differentiated. Product
welfare implications for the effect of technological change in the advertising sector. In
ing cost innovation, equilibrium prices fall and the market converges to the socially
tion for brands that are sufﬁciently close substitutes, whereas equilibrium prices rise
when brands are more differentiated.1. IntroductionAn important role of advertising is to provide consumers with
factual information about product attributes. Advertising that informs
consumers about product speciﬁcations beneﬁts society both by
stimulating the exchange of products to new customers and by
facilitating better matches between existing customers and brands.
But advertising is also a costly activity, for instance annual advertising
expenditures in the U.S. represent approximately 2.3% of GDP
(Advertising Age), and delivering informative advertisements to
consumers who are already informed about products is a socially
wasteful activity.
This paper addresses the efﬁciency of informative advertising
outcomes in oligopoly markets. Social and private advertising
incentives differ in the model due to three external effects, the
relative importance of which depends on how the value of informa-
tion is capitalized among “new” and “existing” customers in the
market. Informative advertising that reaches new consumers embo-
dies an externality familiar to search goods: The cost of search is borne
entirely by the searcher, while the beneﬁts are divided between the
searcher and the agent with whom she trades. This market size effect
causes advertising to be undersupplied in the market equilibrium.
Informative advertising that reaches existing consumers of a rival
brand potentially improves the matches between consumers and
brands, thereby raising consumer utility. Because advertising ﬁrms areRichards, and Kyle Stiegert for
ystem Research Group at theunable to fully appropriate these rents, thismatching effect also causes
advertising to be undersupplied in the market equilibrium. But
informative advertising by one brand that reaches existing consumers
of a rival brand also serves to attract customers away from rivals, an
activity that is less valuable to society than to individual ﬁrms. This
business-stealing effect causes advertising to be oversupplied in the
market equilibrium.
The analysis is framed by a differentiated-product oligopoly model
with imperfect information. Consumers have heterogeneous tastes for
product attributes, but are unaware of the attributes contained in
individual brands without receiving an advertisement from that
brand. The role of advertising is to convey factual information to
consumers about the prices and product speciﬁcations of the
advertised brand. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) (henceforth GS)
employ this framework to compare private and social advertising
outcomes in a model with highly substitutable brands. GS demon-
strate that advertising decreases equilibrium prices and that the
market level of advertising exceeds the socially optimal level of
advertising when the brands are sufﬁciently close substitutes. Sober-
man (2004) extends this model to show that the equilibrium price is
increasing in the level of advertising for more differentiated brands,
but does not examine welfare implications as done here.
The basic message of this paper is that the efﬁciency of markets for
purely informative advertising depends on the extent of product
differentiation in the industry. The reason is that themarket size effect
and the matching effect decrease with the degree of product
differentiation in the market, while the business-stealing effect
increases (up to the limit of oligopoly interaction in the market). For
highly substitutable products, informative advertising produces
relatively large market size effects and negligible business-stealing
effects. Advertising, accordingly, is undersupplied. For more
differentiated goods, the business-stealing effect dominates the
combined inﬂuence of the market size and matching effects, and
advertising is oversupplied. However, for still more differentiated
products, local monopoly markets emerge: The business-stealing
externality vanishes, and advertising is again undersupplied.
The analysis reconciles some conﬂicting results in the advertising
literature. In particular, the welfare implications of informative
advertising under differentiated, but highly substitutable brands in
GS contrasts with thewelfare implications that emerge inmodels with
homogenous goods. Stegeman (1991) and Stahl (1994) show that
purely informative advertising exists only in mixed strategies and is
always undersupplied under price competition, and Gary-Bobo and
Michel (1991) ﬁnd that advertising does not occur at all as the number
of ﬁrms becomes large under quantity competition.1 This distinction
turns out to arise from the use of the “large group” assumption of Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) in differentiated product models. The present paper
removes this assumption and demonstrates that advertising is always
undersupplied (in pure strategies) below a critical level of product
differentiation.
The paper also numerically examines the welfare implications of
technological change in the advertising sector. Technological change is
important in advertising markets, as the emergence of newmedia, for
instance digital platforms and content networking on the internet, can
reduce the cost of achieving a given reach of an ad campaign. In
response to an advertising cost innovation, advertising frequencies
rise, and this produces welfare implications that depend on the extent
of product differentiation in the market. For highly substitutable
products, greater advertising frequencies increase demand elasticities
(and reduce prices), and the market equilibrium converges to the
social optimum. For highly differentiated products, greater advertising
frequencies decrease demand elasticities and raise equilibrium prices.
A reduction in advertising cost exacerbates both advertising and price
distortions in the market, and the market equilibrium diverges from
the social optimum.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next
section describes consumer demand for differentiated products.
Section 3 derives market equilibria under local monopoly and two
types of oligopoly that emerge according to whether or not
advertisements received by consumers who are already aware of the
rival brand create new consumption units. Section 4 calculates the
socially optimal advertising allocation and presents a comparison of
optimal and market advertising levels, with numerical analysis
provided to support the main results.
2. Informative advertising and consumer demand
Consider a duopolistic industry in which ﬁrms sell differentiated
brands to consumers. Each consumer is atomistic and has unit
demand. Consumers rely on information received from advertise-
ments to locate speciﬁc brands in the product space and do not engage
in any activities to acquire information other than by viewing ads. The
advertisements are truthful and convey information about the
existence of products and the attributes contained in each brand.
Brands in the model differ according to their characteristics in the
sense of Lancaster (1975). The role of advertising is to match
consumers to the products that best suit their tastes. This demand
structure is represented by a Hotelling (1929) “linear city”, in which
consumers are identiﬁed according to points on a line segment that
correspond to their ideal product characteristics.2 Firms are located at1 In Gary-Bobo and Michel (1991), advertising is a collective good that shifts the
demand of all ﬁrms. Their results are in accordance with the general outcome of
oligopoly models when ﬁrms invest in a collective good.
2 The merit of this approach over a Salop (1979) circular city model is its simplicity,
and the two models produce qualitatively similar results in settings without entry.the endpoints of the line segment and consumers are distributed
uniformly with unit density over the interval.
Each consumer purchases at most one unit and receives a gross
value of v from consuming the product. Consumers incur transporta-
tion costs of t per unit of distance, so that the net surplus enjoyed by a
consumer who purchases a brand a distance x units away at a price of
p is v−p− tx. Consumers purchase the product only if they are aware of
a brand in the product category that offers positive net surplus, and a
consumer who is aware of both brands selects the brand that provides
the highest net surplus.
Following Butters (1977), the advertising process is speciﬁed by
assuming ﬁrms send independent advertising messages and have no
ability to target advertisements towards consumers located at
particular points in the product space.3 Let ϕi denote the advertising
intensity of ﬁrm i. Advertising intensity is measured in terms of the
reach of the ad campaign, so that ϕi is interpreted as the fraction of the
consumer population that is exposed, at least once, to the advertising
message of ﬁrm i. This divides consumers at each location in the
product space into four types: With probability ϕiϕj, j≠ i, a consumer
simultaneously receives advertising messages from both brands; with
probability ϕi(1−ϕj) a consumer receives an ad from brand i but not
from brand j; with probability (1−ϕi)ϕj a consumer receives an ad
from brand j but not from brand i; and with probability (1−ϕi)(1−ϕj) a
consumer fails to receive any advertising message at all. Aggregate
demand facing each ﬁrm sums the demand functions among
consumers of each type.
The market equilibrium studied is the symmetric, non-coopera-
tive Nash equilibrium in prices (p) and advertising intensities (ϕ).
There are four types of market equilibrium. First, there are mixed
strategy equilibria: For various levels of product differentiation
these are the only equilibria that exist. Apart from the regions that
contain only mixed strategy equilibria, a monopoly region and two
oligopoly regions emerge that support symmetric, pure strategy
Nash equilibria. If the market prices are set at a level that a fully-
informed consumer located at the midpoint of the segment buys
neither brand (i.e., demand regions do not “overlap”), a local mono-
poly equilibrium emerges. If all fully-informed consumers make a
purchase at the prevailing market prices, the type of oligopoly
equilibrium that emerges depends on whether prices are set at a
level that also induces all partially informed consumers to purchase
the brand. Partially-informed consumers travel farther (on average)
than fully-informed consumers in the market, because imperfect
information can lead to inferior matches between consumers and
brands. The market is described hereafter to be “completely covered”
if all consumers who receive at least one advertising message
purchase a brand at prevailing prices, t≤ (v−p); and the market is
described to be “incompletely covered” if at least one partially
informed consumer does not make a purchase at prevailing prices:
t/2≤ (v−p)b t.
GS consider the case of complete coverage. The equilibrium prices
in their model are assumed to be sufﬁciently low that all consumers
receiving an advertising message purchase the product, even if doing
so requires traveling the entire length of the line segment. Under
incomplete coverage, the equilibrium prices are low enough that a
fully informed consumer located at the midpoint of the line segment
purchases the product, v−p≥ t/2, but high enough that a partially
informed consumer located at the endpoint of the line ﬁnds it
prohibitively costly to travel the entire length of the line segment to
purchase the more distant brand, v−pb t.
Among the fully informed population of consumers, let xif(pi, pj)
denote the distance from ﬁrm i to the consumer who is indifferent3 For an analysis of the case of targeted advertising, see Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-
Boas (2005).
between purchasing brand i and brand j (j≠ i) at prices pi and pj. The
location of xif(pi, pj) is given algebraically by
xif
 
pi;pj =
 
t + pj  pi =2t: ð1Þ
All fully informed consumers at locations x≤xif(pi, pj) prefer brand i
to brand j, so that Eq. (1) deﬁnes the demand facing brand i from its
fully informed consumers. Firms also face demand from partially
informed consumers. Let xip(pi) denote the location of the partially
informed consumer who is indifferent between purchasing brand i at
a price of pi or purchasing nothing at all.4 This value is given by
xipð Þpi = ð Þv pi =t: ð2Þ
Consumers located between xif(pi, pj) and xip(pi) would prefer brand
j to brand i if fully informed, but nevertheless prefer brand i to
consuming nothing at all when partially informed.
Demand for each ﬁrm is described below for each of the three
regions that deﬁne the degree of market coverage. For ease in
exposition, the degree of market coverage is expressed for now in
terms of the (endogenous) prices. The relationship between themodel
primitives and the type of market coverage is considered in the
subsequent section.
Under local monopoly, 2(v−p)b t, a consumer located at the
midpoint of the line does not purchase either brand, even when
fully informed. Hence, demand facing the representative ﬁrm depends
only on the population of consumers that receive his advertising
message. Demand for product i accordingly is
Xˆi

pˆ ˆi;/ Þ = ˆ i/ ˆ ˆ ˆi ixp
 
pi =/i
 
v pi =t; i = 0;1: ð3Þ
Notice that the price elasticity of demand under local monopoly,
εˆ= pˆ/(v− pˆ), is not a function of the advertising level. Advertising
messages are as likely to strike nearby consumers as ones farther
away, and it follows that advertising produces purely a scaling effect
on demand.
Under incomplete coverage, (v−p)b t≤2(v−p), all fully informed
consumers purchase one of the two brands, but a partially informed
consumers located on the far end of the line segment from the
advertised brand does not make a purchase. The demand for brand i is
given by the weighted sum of the demands in Eqs. (1) and (2),
Xi
 
pi;p ij;/i;/j = /i/jxf
 
pi;p ij +/i
 
1 /j xpð Þpi i≠j; i = 0;1;
Simplifying this expression using Eqs. (1) and (2) gives
i  /X pi;pj;/i;/j = i 2 1  /j v +/jt   2 /j pi +/jpj ; i≠j; i = 0;1:2t
ð4Þ
In the symmetric case, the price elasticity of demand facing ﬁrm i,
εi=−(∂Xi /∂pi)pi /x ii, evaluated at pi=p, X =X, and ϕi=ϕ for i=0,1, is
given by e = ð Þ2/ p2 v p 1 / + /t. It is straightforward to verify that advertis-ð Þ ð Þ
ing makes demand less elastic (and therefore raises prices) under
incomplete coverage. The reason is that demand in Eq. (4) is aweighted
average of the demand of fully informed and partially informed
consumers, with weights given by the equilibrium advertising frequen-
cies. The elasticity of demand of fully informed consumers in Eq. (1) is
εf=p/t, and the elasticity of demand of partially informed consumers in
Eq. (2) is εp=p /(v−p). Because v−pb t must hold in equilibrium under
incomplete coverage, it follows that εfbεp. An increase in the equilibrium
4 By the deﬁnition of incomplete coverage, this consumer resides on the unit
interval.advertising intensity expands the share of fully informed consumers in
the market, and this decreases the price elasticity of demand.
Under complete coverage (t≤v−p), the demand for brand i is given
by
X˜i
 
p˜i; p˜
i i
j; /˜ /˜ = /˜ /˜ x
 
p˜ ; p˜ + /˜
 
1 /˜; ˜i j i j f i j i j xp
 
pi ; i ≠ j; i = 0; 1;
Noting (by deﬁnition) that all partially informed consumers of
brand i make a purchase under complete coverage, xip(pˆi)=1, the
demand for brand i is
i
  ! !
t + p˜ p˜
X˜ p˜ p˜ /˜ /˜ ij /˜i =
j
i; jÞ ˜; /i j

+ 1
2t
 /˜; j : ð5Þ
The price elasticity of demand, ε˜ i, evaluated at the symmetric Nash
equilibrium point (p˜ i= p˜ , X˜ i= X˜ , and ϕ˜ = ϕ˜i for i=0,1) is given by
ε˜ = pˆϕˆ/t(2-ϕˆ). As in GS, an increase in the level of informative
advertising increases demand elasticities (and reduces prices). The
reason is that demand is perfectly inelastic (up to the reservation
level) for the subgroup of partially informed consumers under
complete coverage. Advertising, which increases the share of fully
informed consumers in the market, therefore makes demand more
price elastic.
3. Market allocation
Suppose each ﬁrm produces a single brand at marginal production
cost of cN0.5 The cost of sending an advertising message through the
unit population density is A(ϕ;α), where α is a shift parameter that
reﬂects the available advertising technology. Among other things, a
reduction in α captures the effect of the emergence of newmedia such
as digital platforms that can reduce the cost of achieving a given reach
in an ad campaign. The advertising cost function has the following
properties: AϕN0, AαN0, AϕϕN0 and AϕαN0.
Themarket advertising allocation can be classiﬁed according to the
degree of product differentiation (t), net consumption beneﬁts (v−c),
and the advertising cost level (α). For a range of parameter values:
(i) a local monopoly equilibrium exists; (ii) a symmetric, pure
strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the complete coverage region;
and (iii) a symmetric, pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the
incomplete coverage region.6 For alternative parameterizations of
the model, however, equilibrium exists only in mixed strategies. For
instance, when advertising costs are low and the products are highly
differentiated, a ﬁrm's best response to a rival that selects a price in
the incomplete coverage region is to defect to the reservation price
for partially informed consumers (and advertise more frequently).
For a given level of consumption beneﬁts (v), production costs (c),
and advertising costs (α), the equilibrium regions of the model can be
characterized by varying the degree of product differentiation (t) in
the market. Speciﬁcally, let λ(v,c,α) and μ(v,c,α) denote the boundaries
of these regions (characterized formally below) as related to t. The
regions of market coverage can be described as follows: (i) for v−cb t,
a local monopoly equilibrium emerges; (ii) for μ(v,c,α)b t≤v−c, a
mixed strategy equilibrium occurs; (iii) for (v−c)/2b t≤μ(v,c,α), a pure
strategy equilibrium emerges with incomplete coverage; (iv) for λ(v,c,
t)b t≤ (v−c)/2, a mixed strategy equilibrium occurs; and (v) for t≤λ(v,c,
α), a pure strategy equilibrium emerges with complete coverage.
These regions are considered, in turn, below.5 Fixed costs, which play no role in the model, are suppressed.
6 In each region, the second-order conditions hold in the neighborhood of the
symmetric equilibria when Aϕϕ is sufﬁciently large. This is assumed to be the case.
Advertising functions that satisfy this condition include the case of A(.)=−αln(1− f)
considered by Butters (1977) and the case of A(.)=αf2 considered by Soberman (2004).
3.1. Local monopoly: v–c≤ t
The objective of ﬁrm i under local monopoly is to
max pˆ i /i A ˆi c Xˆ pˆ ˆi; /i;α ;
pˆ ˆi ;/i
     
where demand is given by Eq. (3). The ﬁrst order conditions for a
proﬁt maximum (evaluated in the symmetric case pˆ= pˆi= pˆj and
ϕˆ= ϕˆ0= ϕˆ1) are
/ˆ
 
v 2 pˆ + c =t = 0; ð6Þ
 
pˆ c  v pˆ =t = A ˆ//;αÞ: ð7Þ
The simultaneous solution to Eqs. (6) and (7) is pˆe=(v+c)/2 and
ð Þv c 2=4t = A ˆ e/

/ ;αÞ: ð8Þ
Notice that the optimal price is not a function of the advertising
level. This is because, with local monopoly markets, advertising has no
effect on the price elasticity of demand. Making use of the implicit
function theorem on Eq. (8), equilibrium advertising levels increase
with innovations in advertising technology (i.e., smaller α) and
decrease with the degree of product differentiation (t).
3.2. Incomplete coverage: (v−c)/2b t≤μ(v,c,α)
Under incomplete coverage, the objective of ﬁrm i is to
maxð Þpi  c Xi
 
pi;pj;/i;/j i
i ;/i
 A / ;α
p
ð Þ;
where demand is given by Eq. (4). The ﬁrst order conditions for a proﬁt
maximum, evaluated at the symmetric allocation (pˆ= pˆi= pˆj and
ϕˆ= ϕˆ 70= ϕˆ1), are
2ð Þv p ð Þ1 / +/t = ð Þp c ð Þ2 / ; ð9Þ
/ vð Þp c
 
+ 1ð Þ / ð Þ p = A/ð Þ/;α : 102 t ð Þ
The optimal advertising level in Eq. (10) has the following
interpretation. A small increase in advertising that informs a marginal
consumer fully informs the consumer with probability ϕ, in which
case the ﬁrm acquires a purchase exactly half the time. With proba-
bility 1−ϕ, the advertisingunit partially informs themarginal consumer,
inwhich case the likelihood that the ﬁrm acquires a purchase is (v−p)/t,
the length of the segment served by the brand. A small increase in
ϕ therefore generates ϕ/2+(1−ϕ)(v−p)/t in sales and raises proﬁts by
(p−c)(ϕ/2+(1−ϕ)(v−p)/t). Eq. (10) states that this marginal gain be
equal to the marginal cost of informing a consumer, Aϕ(ϕb;α).
To derive the boundaries for the incomplete coverage region,
rearrange Eq. (9) to get
2 1
p / = c +
ð Þ / ð Þv c +/tð Þ :
4 3/ ð11Þ
By the deﬁnition of incomplete coverage, the price is set above the
net surplus level of themost distant consumer on the segment, v−pb t.7 It is possible to rule out “large deviations” in price and advertising levels from the
symmetric Nash equilibrium, for instance the possibility that a ﬁrm responds to a rival
that sets a price in the incomplete coverage region by setting a local monopoly price
(alternatively, a complete coverage price). Details on this issue are available on request.Substituting p(ϕ) from Eq. (11) into this inequality and factoring
terms yields (v−c)/2b t. The price in the incomplete coverage region
must also induce the consumer at the midpoint of the segment to
make a purchase, t/2≤v−p. Making use Eq. (11), this implies
2 2
tV
ð Þ / ð Þv c
:
4 / ð12Þ
Substitution of Eq. (11) into Eq. (10) implicitly deﬁnes the
equilibrium advertising level, ϕe; that is,
ð Þ2 / ½ 2 1ð Þ / ð Þv
=2
 c +/t 2
A Z e/ /;α /
2 4 3/ t
ð Þ ð Þv; c; t;α :
ð Þ
Themaximum price in the incomplete coverage region satisﬁes Eq.
(12) with equality. Substituting ϕe(v,c,t,α) into this equation and
solving for t yields the boundary value, tb=μ(v,c,α).
Let pe and ϕe denote the equilibrium price and advertising level
that solve Eqs. (9) and (10). Making use of the implicit function
theorem on these equations, it is straightforward to verify that both
equilibrium advertising levels and equilibrium prices increase in
response to innovations in advertising technology (i.e., smaller α).8
Schmalensee (1986) reports the stylized fact that advertising
intensities are positively related to industry-average proﬁtability. This
is the case here as well: Following a change in industry-speciﬁc exo-
genous variables (v, c, or t), conditions that lead to greater advertising
frequencies are also associated with higher industry proﬁtability. To see
this, note that demand in Eq. (4) is linear in advertising, so that proﬁt for
the representative ﬁrm can be written
πð Þ/;α = A/ð Þ/;α / Að Þ/;α :
Proﬁts are increasing in advertising levels by the convexity of the
advertising cost function.
3.3. Complete coverage: t≤λ(v,c,α)
Under complete coverage, the objective of ﬁrm i is to
max
 
p˜ X˜i  c i
 
p˜ /˜i; p˜j; /˜i; j  A
 
/˜i;α
p˜ ˜i ;/i
where demand is given by Eq. (3). The ﬁrst order conditions for a proﬁt
maximum, evaluated at a symmetric allocation, are
t
 
2 /˜  /˜ p˜ c = 0; ð13Þ
 
p˜ c
 
1 /˜=2 = A ˜/
 
/;α : ð14Þ
The market advertising condition (14) is intuitive. A marginal
increase in ϕ˜ informs (on average) one more consumer. With
probability ϕ˜, this consumer was previously informed of the rival
brand and now becomes fully informed, in which case the ﬁrm
acquires a purchase exactly half the time. With probability 1− ϕ˜, this
consumer becomes partially informed, in which the ﬁrm always
acquires a purchase. A small increase in ϕ˜ therefore generates 1− ϕ˜/2
in sales to the advertising ﬁrm and raises proﬁts by (p˜ −c)(1− ϕ˜/2). Eq.
(14) balances this marginal gain against themarginal cost of informing
the consumer, Aϕ(ϕ˜;α).8 Equilibrium advertising levels can rise or fall with an increase in the degree of
product differentiation (t). Advertising levels rise with t when advertising costs are
sufﬁciently low, but fall with t when ads are more costly.
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Rearranging Eq. (13), the market price satisﬁes
2
/˜ = c +
 
 /˜ t
:
/˜
ð15Þ
Substituting this value into Eq. (14) deﬁnes the equilibrium
vertising level, ϕ˜e,
2
 /˜ t
= A ˜
2/˜
/
 
/;α Z/˜eð Þt;α :
By the deﬁnition of complete coverage, the price is set below the net
rplus level of the most distant consumer on the segment, p≤v−t.
bstituting p˜(ϕ˜) from Eq. (15) into this inequality and factoring terms
ves t
˜
V/ð Þvc2 . The maximum value of t that leads to a symmetric pure
ategy Nash equilibrium in the complete coverage region satisﬁes this
lationship with equality; substitution of ϕ˜e(t,α) into this equation and
lving for t yields the boundary value t˜ b=λ(v,c,α).
Let pe˜ and ϕ˜e denote the equilibrium price and advertising level
at solve Eqs. (13) and (14). Use of the implicit function theorem on
ese equations reveals that both equilibrium prices and equilibrium
vertising levels rise with the degree of product differentiation (t),
hereas innovations in advertising technology (i.e., smaller α) stimu-
te greater advertising levels and lead to lower prices.
. Boundaries between regions
For the range of product differentiation μ(v,c,α)b t≤v−c and λ(v,c,
b t≤ (v−c)/2, an oligopoly equilibrium exists only in mixed strategies.
havior in the regions of mixed strategy equilibria, which is not
rmally considered here, may be characterized by sporadic advertis-
g campaigns or by randomized pricing strategies.9
To develop some further insight on these different outcomes,
nsider the advertising cost specialization of Butters (1977), A(ϕ;α)=
ln(1−ϕ). Let c=0 so that v denotes the net social value of
nsumption (gross of transportation costs). The outcome of the
odel for various (t, v) pairs is depicted in Fig. 1. The 45-degree line
= t depicts the boundary between the incomplete coverage region
d the local monopoly region. For (t, v) pairs to the right of this line, a
Under complete coverage there is an incentive for ﬁrms to defect from a pure price
ategy to the reservation price for partially informed consumers, p=v − t, whereas
der incomplete coverage there is an incentive for ﬁrms to defect from a pure price
ategy to the local monopoly price, p= t+c.cal monopoly equilibrium emerges. The locus at vu=2t denotes the
per boundary of the incomplete coverage region. The incomplete
verage region is comprised of all (t, v) pairs between this locus
d the 45-degree line. This region is further divided by the locus
=3t/2 −2α, with the area above the vl locus representing (t, v) pairs
at support a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and the area
tween the vl locus and the 45-degree line representing the region
here an equilibrium exists only in mixed strategies. The locus v˜
ilarly divides the complete coverage region into regions with pure
rategy and mixed strategy equilibria.
Numerical results for this advertising specialization are presented
Section 4.4. The numerical analysis calculates the outcomes for
ices and advertising for variations in t, which amounts to ﬁxing a
lue of v on the vertical axis of Fig. 1 and moving laterally through
e different market regions as the degree of product differentiation
creases.
Social optimum
This section compares the equilibrium outcomes of themodel with
e socially optimal resource allocation. An obstacle in the way of
aking such a comparison is that the socially optimal advertising
tensity depends on the market coverage at the efﬁcient prices
⁎=c), and this differs from the equilibrium prices. For this reason,
e social level of market coverage and the private level of market
verage generally do not coincide. In GS, this problem is handled by
librating the output levels prior to optimization with the “large-
oup” assumption of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In Stegeman (1991) and
ahl (1994), this issue is sidestepped by inferringwelfare implications
directly from the advertising level selected by the highest-priced
m. Here, following Spence (1975), a “partial view” of advertising is
ken that involves comparing the equilibrium advertising outcome to
e socially optimal advertising allocation conditional on the equili-
ium market prices. Speciﬁcally, the social price level is ﬁxed at
e e=p for all advertising comparisons, where p is the equilibrium
ice level, and the social and private return to advertising is compared
this (common) price level in each region.
. Local monopoly
The socially optimal advertising allocation depends on industry
oﬁts and the surplus consumers receive from purchasing a brand
et of transportation costs) in the market. Under local monopoly, a
nsumer receives an advertising message from the representative
and with probability ϕˆ. At a price of pˆ⁎= pˆe, some consumers
rchase the brand and some do not. The conditional probability that
consumer buys the product after receiving the advertising message
(v− pˆe)/t. Conditional on this sale, producer surplus for the
vertising ﬁrm is pˆe−c and consumer surplus per brand (on average)
v−pˆe−T, where T is travel cost. Because the average consumer who
rchases the brand travels a distance of (v−pe)/2t, travel cost for this
nsumer is T=(v− pˆe)/2, so that consumer surplus per brand (on
erage) is (v− pˆe)/2.
Aggregatewelfare,which is taken to be the sumof consumer surplus
d producer surplus in both local monopoly regions, is given by
2/ˆ
=
 
v pˆe  !v pˆe
+ pˆe  c  2A
 
/ˆ;α :
t 2
The change in social welfare resulting from a (bilateral) change in
vertising frequency is
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unit segment to make a purchase, which generates the social net
beneﬁt of v−pe˜ − t/4. With probability 2ϕ˜(1− ϕ˜), a consumer receives
exactly one advertising message. This message is equally likely to be
received from the nearest brand as from the farthest brand, so that aA small increase in ϕˆ that informs one more consumer induces
purchase with frequency (v− pˆe)/t, and the additional sale con
tributes (v− pˆe)/2 (on average) to consumer surplus and pˆe− c t
producer surplus. The marginal social return to advertising in Eq
(16) is the sum of these surplus gains less the marginal social cost o
advertising.
The efﬁciency of the market advertising outcome can be assesse
by evaluating the welfare change in Eq. (16) at the market advertisin
level, ϕˆ= ϕˆe. Upon substitution from Eq. (7),
AWˆ j v=
 2
 pˆe
N0:
A 2/ˆÞ ˆ ˆ/ = / e 2tð
Proposition 1. (Shapiro, 1980). Informative advertising is undersup
plied under local monopoly.
The reason a local monopolist undersupplies purely informativ
advertising is that only the market size effect is at work in th
industry. There are no matching or business-stealing effects unde
monopoly because the demand regions of ﬁrms do not overlap. Th
only distortion that remains in the market advertising level arise
from the monopolists' inability to appropriate the gain in consume
surplus resulting from reduced cost of consumer search. Speciﬁcally
the social beneﬁt of an additional purchase, v−c− tx, exceeds th
private beneﬁt, p–c, by the amount of surplus consumers receive i
the market, v–p− tx. As a result, the magnitude of the advertisin
inefﬁciency is the product of the additional customers anticipate
from a marginal advertising unit, (v− pˆ)/t, and the average level o
consumer surplus a sale provides, (v− pˆ)/2.
4.2. Incomplete coverage
Under incomplete coverage, a consumer receives advertisin
messages from both brands with probability ϕ2 and becomes full
informed. Each fully informed consumer purchases the nearest brand
and this generates net surplus (on average) of v−pe− t/4. Wit
probability 2ϕ(1−ϕ), a consumer receives an advertising messag
from only one of the two brands. Among these partially informe
consumers, some choose to purchase the advertised brand and other
do not. The conditional probability that a consumer makes a purchas
given that a single advertising message is received is ( v−pe)/t. Thu
the probability that a consumer receives a single ad and also ﬁnds
worthwhile to consume the brand is 2ϕ(1−ϕ)(v−pe)/t. Partially
informed consumers who make a purchase travel a distance o
(v −pe)/2t (on average), and this generates net consumer surplus o
(v−pe)/2.
Aggregate welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus an
producer surplus,
t ð Þ 22
 
e / 1 /W ð Þv=/ v p  +  p
e
4 t
/ pe
+
ð Þ c
2 1
t
½ ð Þ / ð Þv pe +/t  2Að Þ/;α :
The third and fourth terms on the right-hand side of the welfar
expression are industry proﬁts.
The change in social welfare resulting from a bilateral change i
advertising frequency is
 !
e 2 e 2AW v
= 1
 pð Þ /
A
ð Þ
+/ vð Þ 2t  p
e t ð Þv p
2/

4

2t
pe
+
 c
1
t
ð Þð Þ 2/ ð Þv pe +/t  A/Proceeding as above by evaluating the welfare change at th
market advertising level, ϕ=ϕe in Eq. (10), the welfare change can b
expressed, after slight manipulation, as
AW j 2= 1ð Þ e v + e v pe/ ð Þ pe t v e/  !ð Þ p 2  17Að Þ2/ / = e/ 2t 4 2t ð e
e p  c/ v
t
 
 pe t  :
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Condition (17) has an intuitive interpretation. Amarginal increase i
ϕ informs a previously uninformed customer with probability (1−ϕ
With probability (v−pe)/t, this customer also purchases the produc
generating social surplus (on average) of (v−pe)/2. The expected socia
value of informing a previously uninformed consumer is the marke
2
size effect: 1ð Þ e v/ ð Þpe N2t 0. Themarket size effect causes advertising t
be undersupplied. With probability ϕ, the marginal consumer become
fully informed. The resulting consumption generates social surplus (o
average) of v−pe−t/4, but entails the opportunity cost (v−p– pe)2/2t. Th
expected social value of fully informing a consumer is the matchin
effect, e ð Þ
e
/ v pe  t 4  v p
2
2t . Thematching effect causes advertising t
be unders
 
upplied.10 When the marginal consumer becomes full
informed, however, this also intensiﬁes the oligopoly rivalry betwee
ﬁrms. Advertisingbyoneﬁrm imposes a negative externalityon the riva
ﬁrm's sales, and the value of the loss in sales is represented by th
difference between the marginal contribution of advertising to aggre
gate proﬁts and the marginal contribution of advertising to individua
proﬁt. This is the
e
business-stealing effect, / ð Þp
ec  v pe  t bt 2 0. Th
business-stealing effect causes advertising to be oversupplied.
Proposition 2. Under incomplete coverage, informative advertising
undersupplied for values of t close to μ(v,c,α); informative advertising
undersupplied for values of t close to (v−c)/2 when advertising costs ar
sufﬁciently high and otherwise oversupplied.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The relationship between the market advertising level and th
socially optimal advertising level depends jointly on the degree o
product differentiation (t) and on advertising costs (α) in the marke
The reason is that the market size effect exists only for partiall
informed consumers, who become aware of a brand with frequenc
1−ϕe, while the matching effect and business-stealing effect exist
only for fully informed consumers, who become aware of bot
brands with frequency ϕe. As advertising costs decrease, ϕe rise
increasing the population of fully-informed consumers on th
interval, which weakens the market size effect and strengthens th
matching effect and business-stealing effect in the market.
4.3. Complete coverage
Under complete coverage, all consumers who receive at least on
advertising message purchase the good. The gross value of consump
tion is v−pe˜ for each consumer, regardless of the consumer's locatio
in the product space. Total transportation costs, however, depend o
the extent to which consumers at each location are aware of th
existence of individual brands.
With probability ϕ˜2, a consumer receives both advertisin
messages. This consumer travels (on average) 1/4 the length of th10 Formally, v−pe− t/4− (v−pe)2/2t=v−pe− t/2− (v−pe)(v−pe− t)/tN0, which is positive
by the deﬁnition of incomplete coverage (v−peb t).
Fig. 2. Advertising outcomes when advertising costs are “low” (v=1, c=0, α=0.1).
Fig. 3. Advertising outcomes when advertising costs are “high” (v=1, c=0, α=0.2).
Fig. 4. Welfare outcomes under complete coverage with variations in advertising costs (v=1, c=0, t=0.1).the market equilibrium position (pe, ϕe) and at the socially optimal
resource allocation (p⁎=0, ϕ⁎) for both levels of oligopoly market
coverage. This provides a full welfare assessment of the market
outcome under both pricing and advertising distortions. In each case,
the net value of consumption is given by v=1 and c=0 and the degree
of product differentiation is selected to maintain the equilibrium level
of market coverage for the range of advertising costs considered.1313 For the entire range of incomplete coverage, the social price level (p⁎=0) results in
complete coverage.Fig. 4 displays the private and social welfare outcomes in response
to changes in advertising cost (α) under complete coverage. The
degree of product differentiation is ﬁxed in each case at t=0.1, and the
private and social welfare outcomes are numerically calculated for
variations in α. (Under complete coverage, the difference in welfare is
due only to variations in social and private advertising levels, because
prices serve only to redistribute rents.) Notice that the welfare level in
the market equilibrium approaches the social optimum as advertising
costs decline (i.e., moving right to left as α decreases). Innovations
that reduce advertising costs result in a convergence of welfare
outcomes under complete coverage.
Fig. 5. Welfare outcomes under incomplete coverage with variations in advertising costs (v=1, c=0, t=0.6).Fig. 5 compares the private and social welfare outcomes in
response to changes in advertising cost (α) under incomplete
coverage (for t=0.6). Notice that advertising cost innovations that
reduce α cause the market equilibrium outcome to diverge from
the socially optimal resource allocation under incomplete coverage.
The reason is that a rise in prices (advertising ﬁxed) leads to a
decrease in the level of market sales. As advertising costs decrease,
the welfare level rises sharply in the socially optimal resource
allocation, but remains relatively ﬂat in the market allocation, as
greater advertising frequencies decrease the demand elasticities
facing ﬁrms and increase the equilibrium market prices. Higher
market prices deter sales, and this dampens the return to
innovations that reduce advertising costs.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has considered a model of purely informative advertis-
ing with differentiated products. Advertising informs consumers
about prices and the attributes of products, and doing so improves
the matches between consumers and brands. Relative to the social
optimum, advertising levels in the market equilibriumwere shown to
be too low when the competing brands are highly substitutable, too
high when the brands are moderately differentiated, and too low
again when the brands are highly differentiated.
Advertising cost innovations that improve the delivery of ads
(expenditure given) have disparate affects on welfare that depend on
the degree of product differentiation in the market. At low levels of
product differentiation, a decrease in advertising costs causes
equilibrium prices and advertising levels to converge towards the
socially optimal levels, whereas divergence occurs at higher levels of
product differentiation.
A number of empirical studies have found advertising to create
both market size effects and to alter the market shares of ﬁrms. For
example, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) ﬁnd cigarette advertising
increased total market demand without a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
market shares, while Nelson (1999) ﬁnds advertisements for beer,
wine and distilled spirits altered market shares among advertised
brands without an appreciable affect onmarket demand. The present
model highlights the importance of isolating these effects in
empirical studies of advertising. In industrial settings where
advertising produces negligible effects on market size, advertising
is more likely to be oversupplied and technological innovations that
reduce advertising costs can lead to a deterioration of market
performance.	
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2. First consider the case in which t=μ(v,c,α).
In this case, a symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium emerges in which
v−pe= t/2. Making this substitution into Eq. (17) and expressing the
boundary in terms of ϕe yields
AW j 2ð Þv c ð Þ2 e e/ / ð Þ1 e/= e e e :Að Þ2/ t = μð Þv;c;α ð Þ4 / 8  ð Þ2 / ð Þ4 3/
The sign of this expression is given by the sign of the term k=
(2−ϕe)2(4−3ϕe)−8ϕe(1−ϕe). Factoring terms yields k=4(1−ϕe)2
(4−ϕe)+ϕe
3
N0. Next consider the case inwhich (v−c)/t=2. In this case,
a symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium emerges in which v−pe=t.
Making this substitution into Eq. (17) yields
AW j v= ð Þ c ð Þ2 3 e/ :Að Þ2/ t = 8ð Þvc =2
The equilibrium advertising levels rise monotonically in the range
ϕe∈ (0,1) with innovations in advertising technology (i.e., smaller α);
hence a critical value of α exists, denoted αc, for which ϕe(αc)=2/3.
The remainder of the proof holds by continuity. □
Proof of Proposition 3. Making use of Eq. (13), expression Eq. (19)
can be written as
AW j 1= h i4 1  ˜ e/ ð Þv p   6 5 ˜ e/ t A:1
A
 
˜ ˜ ˜/ / e 42/ =
 ð Þ
At the lower boundary of the complete coverage region, t=λ(v,c,α),
a symmetric, pure strategy equilibrium emerges in which v−pe= t.
Making this substitution in (A.1) yields
e
A j =  ˜W /
 
2 /˜e ð Þv c
A
  b0:
2/˜ t = λð Þv;c;α 8
The market equilibrium involves an inefﬁciently high level of
advertising under complete coverage in the neighborhood of t=λ(v,
c,α) (by continuity). For smaller values of t, note by the implicit
function theorem on Eqs. (13) and (14), that dpe˜ /dtb0 and dϕ˜e/dtN0.
In the limit as t→0, the price and advertising levels converge to pe˜ →c
and ϕ˜e→0. It follows that the right-hand side of (A.1) converges to
4(v− c)N0 and advertising is undersupplied.
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